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The ElB's Financial Product 
Over the years, EIB lending has shown a steady growth. With loans totalling 
ECU 5.9 billion in 1984 and reaching ECU 7.8 billion in 1987, the demand for EIB 
finance has remained strong even during the economic recession of the 
mid-eighties, confirming the upward trend in the Bank's activities. In 1988, 
the volume of annual lending for the first time passed the ECU 10 billion mark 
and a significant increase in activity is expected again this year. 
Why do project promoters turn to the European Investment Bank for 
finance ? 
that the promoter is not only interested 
in the Bank's project appraisal know-
how, but especially in a financial prod-
uct conceived and priced in a market 
oriented fashion. 
In brief 
Specific objective 
The ElB's lending is directed towards 
capital investment projects which have 
one thing in common : they contribute to 
the balanced development of the Euro-
pean Community. The Bank has a speci-
fic mission and this implies a certain sel-
ectivity in what it can do. In practice, 
however, a wide range of investment 
projects across all sectors of the econ-
omy has received EIB finance because, 
directly or indirectly, they supported this 
broad objective given to the Bank by the 
Treaty of Rome. 
First informal contact between the pro-
ject promoter and the EIB normally indi-
cates whether the investment project 
falls within the Bank's terms of refer-
ence. Once this has been confirmed, the 
promoter can expect the EIB to have a 
genuine interest in seeing the project 
implemented in the best possible 
fashion. Working towards the same 
goal, the promoter and a Bank team, 
consisting of a financial expert, an engi-
neer and an economist, will discuss the 
project and the most appropriate form 
of financing. Often, the ElB's experi-
ence, built up in thirty years of project 
appraisal throughout the Community, 
proves to be helpful in fine-tuning the 
investment scheme and the financing 
package. 
Operating in the same environment as 
many other banks, the EIB is well aware 
Excellent standing 
in the capital market 
The conditions the EIB is able to offer 
are a direct consequence of its prime 
access to the capital markets where it 
raises the bulk of its funds, mainly 
through public bond issues and private 
placings. The two main credit rating 
agencies, Moody's and Standard & 
Poor's, have consistently given the 
Bank's issues the highest possible 
('AAA') rating, commending the EIB for 
its sound financial position, its lending 
policy, the high quality of its loan port-
folio, and the solid support of its share-
holders, the member countries of the 
European Community (Moody's Sov-
ereign Credit Report, June 1989; Stan-
dard & Poor's International Creditweek, 
18 September 1988). 
As written into the Treaty of Rome (Art. 
130), the European Investment Bank 
operates on a non-profit making basis. 
Its Statute, which is an integral part of 
the Treaty, stipulates that the Bank's 
interest rates shall be adjusted to condi-
tions prevailing on the capital market 
and calculated in such a way that the 
Bank can meet its obligations (i.e. re-
The European Investment Bank must 
borrow before it can lend. The market 
determines the Bank's possibilities as a 
borrower and a lender. Working on a 
non-profit making basis, the interest ra-
tes the EIB charges reflect its cost of 
borrowing. Consequently, it is in the in-
terest of its borrowers that the EIB uses 
the opportunities offered in the different 
capital markets to their best advantage. 
Mr Marchat, who heads the Finance and 
Treasury Directorate, describes the 
Bank's experience in putting its bond 
issues out to bid (see page 4). 
Supporting capital investment projects 
in all sectors of the economy, the ElB's 
financial product is conceived and pri-
ced in a market oriented fashion. This 
implies flexibility in meeting the project 
promoter's specific needs. The EIB, 
therefore, offers promoters a choice of 
loans, currencies, interest rate formats, 
maturities and grace periods. The ulti-
mate purpose : attaining European Com-
munity objectives by facilitating the im-
plementation of a maximum of sound 
capital investment (see page 1). 
Attractive yes, subsidised no. That is the 
general rule for EIB loans. However, in 
special circumstances the Community or 
its Member States have provided inte-
rest rate subsidies to soften the Bank's 
conditions. From the first financial pro-
tocol between Greece and the EC to 
emergency aid after natural disasters : a 
case history (see page 3). 
Outside the Community, interest rate 
subsidies on EIB loans are a more or 
less regular feature. An overview of 
their occurence from the Yaoundé con-
ventions to Lomé and in the Mediterra-
nean region will appear in a forthcoming 
issue of EIB-Information. 
deem its bonds), cover its operating ex-
penses and build up a reserve fund. 
It is often, mistakenly, thought that the 
European Investment Bank can provide 
'soft' money. In fact, working on a non-
profit making basis, the interest rates 
the EIB charges are determined by its 
own cost of borrowing. Moreover, the 
Bank is prohibited by Statute to 'soften' 
its conditions by reducing its interest 
rates. Where EIB rates have been below 
market rates, interest subsidies were 
provided by third parties. The Bank's 
Statute allows this, subject, however, to 
Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome which 
deals with avoiding distortion of compe-
tition. The Member States or the Euro-
pean Community have, in specific cir-
cumstances, made funds available to re-
duce EIB interest rates (see the over-
view of such instances included in this 
issue of EIB-Information). 
Cost of borrowing + 0.15% 
Determining its interest rates, the Euro-
pean Investment Bank applies a very 
basic rule : the cost of borrowing, taking 
into account the coupon, the issuing 
price and all other costs related to the 
bond issue, plus 0.15% to cover oper-
ating costs. According to this principle, 
rates — varying slightly with the dura-
tion of the loan — are set for each of 
the 15 or so currencies with which the 
Bank works. 
The Bank's interest rates are adjusted 
almost weekly to keep in line with inter-
est rate developments on the capital 
markets. For those currencies where the 
Bank has been absent from the relevant 
market, rates are adjusted to reflect 
yields in the secondary market for its 
own bonds or for new issues of other 
'AAA' borrowers. In this way, borrowers 
from the European Investment Bank, at 
a cost of 15 basis points, have access to 
the world's capital markets at the condi-
tions available to a prime borrower. 
The borrower's choice 
The borrower may request the loan to 
be disbursed in one currency, for ex-
ample the borrower's domestic currency 
or the ecu, or in any mix of currencies. 
Where the loan is paid out in more than 
one currency, the specific interest rate 
for each one is applied. For reference 
purposes, a notional interest rate for the 
mix can, of course, be calculated as a 
weighted average. 
Especially appropriate for project finan-
cing, the bulk of the ElB's lending is 
long-term. Maturities generally range 
from four to twelve years for industrial 
investment and up to twenty years or 
more for infrastructure projects. 
The borrower may choose between a f i -
nance contract in which the interest rate 
for the currency or currencies paid out is 
laid down — that is the rate(s) in force 
on the day of signature — or a finance 
contract stipulating that the interest ra-
te(s) will be the one(s) in force on the 
date(s) of drawdown, which could be in 
one or more tranches. This last arrange-
ment is what the EIB calls an open-rate 
contract. 
In the first case, where the interest rate 
in force on the day of signature applies, 
no commitment fee is charged if the 
borrower draws down the amounts 
agreed within 60 days. 
The open-rate contract gives the bor-
rower up to 18 months for an industrial 
project and up to 24-36 months for in-
frastructure schemes to request dis-
bursement. In practice, the open-rate f i-
nance contract is a free-of-charge form 
of stand-by credit for the project promo-
ter, as the European Investment Bank 
contractually commits itself to disburse 
the funds within four months following 
the borrower's request(s) (normally, the 
Bank's liquidity position permits much 
swifter disbursement). If the borrower 
wishes, the open-rate contract may spe-
cify the currency or combination of cur-
rencies in which the loan is to be paid 
out. 
In both kinds of finance contracts, the 
interest rate can be either fixed for the 
duration of the loan, fixed but adjust-
able, or variable (see below). The Bank's 
standard product has been, and still is, 
long-term loans with fixed interest rates. 
Flexibility : fixed, adjustable or 
floating rates 
When the borrower opts for a fixed in-
terest rate, the rate set in the contract 
will remain valid for the duration of the 
loan. In case of early repayment, the 
Bank will require indemnity. The bor-
rower will be asked to pay a compensa-
tion which varies with the market condi-
tions under which the Bank redeploys 
the prepaid funds. 
The adjustable fixed interest rate 
loans the Bank offers give greater flex-
ibility to the borrower expecting that in-
terest rates will go down in the medium 
to long-term. As the name indicates, the 
loan is provided at a fixed interest rate, 
but the finance contract gives the borro-
wer the opportunity to take advantage 
of a possibly more advantageous inte-
rest rate in force after a predetermined 
number of years, usually 4 to 10, as indi-
cated in the contract. Alternatively, the 
outstanding amount may be repaid on 
the given date without indemnifying the 
Bank. In that case, 45 days advance no-
tice must be given. Under certain cir-
cumstances a third option may exist, 
namely continuing the loan but with the 
Bank making other currencies available. 
Floating rate loans are another altern-
ative. The fixing of the Bank's floating 
interest rate is made on the basis of the 
quarterly average cost for the EIB to 
borrow the currencies concerned, plus 
the Bank's 0.15% margin. In practice, it 
turns out that much of the time the re-
sulting interest rate is well below Libor. 
If the Bank has been given notice 45 
days before the payments of principal 
and interest are due, the client may ef-
fect early repayment on that date with-
out any cost. 
Most loans are repaid in six-monthly or, 
less often, yearly instalments of princi-
pal and interest, but if it benefits the 
project's implementation, individualised 
repayment schedules can be arranged. 
Repayment must take place in the same 
currencies and in the same proportion in 
which the loan was paid out. 
As a rule, grace periods on repayment 
of principal are agreed, most often ran-
ging from two to five years, but varying 
with the nature of the project. 
For all loans : no additional costs or 
fees 
There are no other costs or arrangement 
fees, and no commitment fees if a loan 
is drawn down within the time periods 
described above. All loans are paid out 
at par. 
Fixed, adjustable and floating rate loans 
are the Bank's financing facilities most 
often used. Other projects fare best with 
tailor-made financing and the EIB has 
the financial engineering know-how ena-
bling it to put into place more complex 
financing packages, structuring its finan-
ce to fit with the borrower's specific 
needs. 
Increased flexibility serves only one 
goal : the attainment of European Com-
munity objectives through the imple-
mentation of sound capital investment 
projects. To that end, the financial prod-
uct the EIB offers to project promoters 
is a combination of partnership, project 
financing experience and a growing 
choice of financing facilities, all at a cost 
reflecting the Bank's prime access to the 
capital markets. 
A case history of reducing EIB interest rates 
The preceding article explains how the EIB sets its interest rates and explains 
that in those cases when the Bank's rates have been below its own cost of 
borrowing, interest subsidies have been provided by third parties. Article 19 
of the ElB's Statute allows for such a reduction of the Bank's interest rates 
as long as this is compatible with the Treaty of Rome, Article 92, which deals 
with avoiding distortion of competition. 
Inside the EC, the Member States and the European Community have made 
interest subsidies available when it was appropriate in specific circumstances 
described below (one of the coming issues of E IB-Information will present an 
overview of the interest subsidies provided in the context of the Commun-
ity's development policy). 
Financial protocols EEC-Greece 
Greece became a member of the Euro-
pean Community on 1 January 1981. Sin-
ce 1962, however, Greece was linked to 
the Community through an Association 
Agreement. Two financial protocols, an-
nexed to the Agreement, involved the 
EIB in lending a total of some ECU 350 
million. The first came into effect on 31 
August 1962 (Official Journal No 122 of 
21 November 1962; Official Journal No 
26, 18 February 1963). The EIB was to 
lend up to USD 125 million for invest-
ment bringing the performance of the 
Greek economy closer to the level of the 
European Community. The then six 
Members of the EEC paid for a 3 % inte-
rest subsidy on EIB loans from their na-
tional budgets, pro rata their subscrip-
tion ot the Bank's capital. For up to two 
thirds (USD 83.3 million) of the total 
amount of finance foreseen, transport, 
energy and agricultural projects were 
eligible for subsidy. Lending activities 
were interrupted in 1967 following the 
military junta's coup d'état, but were re-
sumed at the end of 1974 after democ-
racy had been restored. Signed on 28 
February 1977, the second protocol ent-
ered into force on 1 August 1978 and ef-
fectively covered the period up to ac-
cession (Official Journal No. 225, 16 Au-
gust 1978). This protocol provided for 
ECU 225 million in EIB loans. Again, up 
to two thirds of that amount, reserved 
for investment in economic infrastructu-
re and agricultural schemes, carried an 
interest subsidy of 3%, which this time 
was financed from the grant aid of ECU 
45 million the protocol provided from 
the Community budget. 
European Regional 
Fund (ERDF) 
Development 
When the ERDF was established in 1975 
(Official Journal No. L 73, 21 March 
1975) it made a total of ECU 1.3 billion in 
grants available for the years 1975 to 
1977. Within certain limits, the funds 
could be used for a 3 % interest rate 
subsidy on loans from the European In-
vestment Bank on the condition that the 
project was located in an area or region 
eligible for ERDF support. On 6 February 
1979, the first regulation was amended, 
with the possibility of providing interest 
rate subsidies on EIB loans continuing to 
exist (Official Journal L 35, 9 Febraury 
1979). In fact, a subsidy from ERDF 
funds has been applied to a loan from 
the European Investment Bank only 
once. Apparently, Member States gen-
erally prefer outright, one-time capital 
grants to subsidies spread out over the 
maturity of a loan. In later ERDF regula-
tions the interest rebate facility is not 
specifically mentioned. 
Financial aid for Portugal 
The financial cooperation between Por-
tugal and the EIB began in 1975 with ex-
ceptional financial aid to counter the dif-
ficult economic situation following the 
move towards democracy. The EIB was 
to provide up to ECU 150 million in loans 
to finance investment in industry, agri-
culture, energy and transport. These 
loans carried a 3 % interest subsidy paid 
out of the European Community budget 
at a total cost of approximately ECU 30 
million (Bulletin of the European Com-
munities No. 10, 1975). In September 
1978 there followed a financial protocol 
between the Community and Portugal, 
in which ECU 200 million in EIB loans 
was foreseen, of which 150 million car-
ried an interest subsidy of 3 % ; the cost 
of the interest subsidy was not to 
exceed ECU 30 million, again to be paid 
out of the Community budget (Official 
Journal No. L 274, 29 September 1978). 
The protocol covered a five year period, 
but by the end of 1981 the full amount 
had been used. Between 1981 and Por-
tugal's accession to the EC on 1 January 
1986, a pre-accession financial aid pack-
age offered ECU 150 million in EIB loans 
(Official Journal No. L 349, 23 December 
1980). They were directed towards pro-
jects which would facilitate the integra-
tion of the Portuguese economy into 
that of the Community. Up to ECU 125 
million was foreseen to carry a 3 % 
interest subsidy from Community re-
sources for which ECU 25 million was 
budgeted. As it turned out the demand 
for EIB loans was such that, at the re-
quest of the Portuguese Government, 
the maximum of pre-accession EIB len-
ding was extended with ECU 75 million 
on 21 June 1983 and another ECU 150 
million was added on 1 July 1984. Inte-
rest rate subsidies were not made avai-
lable for the two extensions. 
European Monetary System 
The European Council meeting of 4 and 
5 December 1978 laid the basis for the 
European Monetary System and, at the 
same occasion, decided that the EMS 
should include measures to strengthen 
the economies of the less prosperous 
Member States effectively and fully par-
ticipating. A series of decisions followed 
to implement the system : one of these 
was the decision of the Council of the 
European Communities of 3 August 
1979, adopting a regulation whereby the 
eligible State or States would obtain 
ECU 5 billion in subsidised loans, in an-
nual portions of ECU 1 billion, over the 
five year period from 1979 to 1983 (Offi-
cial Journal No. L 200, 8 August 1979). 
(') Principally the proceeds of the Bank's borrowings 
on the capital markets. 
(2) Borrowings contracted by the Commission in the 
name of the EEC, within limits set by the Council, for 
the purpose of promoting investment in the Communi-
ty The Commission decides on the eligibility of pro-
jects for a loan within guidelines laid down by the 
Council. The EIB examines loan applications in accor-
dance with its customary criteria, decides on the 
loans and the terms and then administers them. 
The amount entered in the budget to 
cover the discounted value of these sub-
sidies was ECU 1 billion, divided into 
five annual portions of ECU 200 million. 
Loans from the ElB's own resources (1) 
and from the New Community Instru-
ment (2) for infrastructure projects and 
programmes were eligible for a 3 % in-
terest rate subsidy paid out of the EC 
budget. The objective was to contribute 
to resolving the main structural prob-
lems of the State(s) concerned, in parti-
cular to reducing regional imbalances 
and improving the employment situa-
tion. In a separate decision of the same 
date, the Council designated Ireland and 
Italy as beneficiaries of the Regulation 
as they fulfilled the double condition of 
(a) effectively and fully participating in 
the mechanisms of the European Mone-
tary System, and (b) being considered 
less prosperous (Official Journal No. L 
200, 8 August 1979). Two thirds of the 
subsidies were destined for Italy, one 
third for Ireland. 
Emergency aid 
In November 1980, the regions of Cam-
pania and Basilicata in Southern Italy 
were stricken by a heavy earthquake. 
On 20 January 1981 the Council of the 
European Communities took the deci-
sion to make 3 % interest rebates avail-
able for up to ECU 1 billion in loans from 
the ElB's own resources and those from 
the New Community Instrument for in-
vestment helping the reconstruction of 
economic and social infrastructure in the 
stricken areas (Official Journal No. L 37, 
10 February 1981). 
A similar decision was taken by the 
Council on 14 December 1981, this time 
benefitting the parts of Greece which 
were stricken by earthquakes in Febru-
ary and March of that year (Official 
Journal No. L 367, 23 December 1981). A 
3 % interest subsidy was made available 
for up to ECU 80 million in loans from 
the ElB's own resources as well as the 
New Community Instrument to help the 
reconstruction of the means of produc-
tion and the economic and social infras-
tructure. 
Following earthquakes in Greece, brin-
ging damage to the town of Kalamata 
and its surroundings in September 1986, 
the Council decided on 7 November 
1988 to stimulate reconstruction work by 
making a 3 % interest rate subsidy avai-
lable for up to ECU 100 million in loans 
from the European Investment Bank (Of-
ficial Journal No. L 309, 15 November 
1988). 
In all three cases, the rebates were 
chargeable to the Community budget for 
loans with a duration of up to twelve 
years. 
The bond market 
The ElB's experience with 
competitive bidding procedures (*) 
by Philippe MARCHAT, Manager of the Finance and Treasury Directorate 
The ElB's experience with competitive bidding procedures designed to dele-
gate mandates to lead bankers for its bond issues is a sensitive question, 
which I should like to approach from a more general context than that simply 
of tendering techniques in the strict sense of the phrase. The following 
observations reflect my own viewpoint on the issue. 
explains the diversity of the markets to 
which it addresses itself. Each of these 
has its own usages and characteristics, 
to which the Bank must adjust. It does 
This experience is inextricably bound up 
with three fundamental factors that 
shape both the ElB's operating environ-
ment and the trend of the markets. 
1. We have the multiplicity of curren-
cies used by the EIB, 17 in all, which 
so pragmatically. 
This diversity in the sources of supply 
for EIB funds has been rendered even 
more fundamental by the massive 
growth in the Bank's activity in recent 
years. In 1988, for instance, we ad-
vanced a total of 11.2 billion ecus in new 
loans in these various currencies. This 
called for operations to borrow the cur-
rencies required, in general directly, 
with an increasing bias towards Euro-
(') This article is based on the speech delivered by 
Mr Marchat at the Government Borrowers' Forum 
meeting held in Helsinki on 15 June 1989, bringing to-
gether both public-sector borrowers and the finance 
managers of supranational development banks. 
pean Community currencies, which in 
1988 accounted for some 84% of the 7.7 
billion ecus raised, a rise of some 30% 
over 1987. 
2. The second factor is the phenomenon 
of the progressive liberalisation and at 
times considerable development expe-
rienced in most of these markets in 
recent years, especially in Europe, for 
instance France, Italy and latterly Spain. 
In this area, when choosing its lead 
managers and setting up bank syndic-
ates, the EIB, depending on the market, 
will generally observe procedures as 
handed down by Governments and 
public agencies when borrowing on their 
home markets, especially within the 
Community, or take its cue from other 
supranational institutions, especially the 
World Bank, on various international or 
non-Community markets. 
3. In this general context, the EIB pur-
sues one objective, common to all bor-
rowers, whether or not comparable, 
which is to command the greatest possi-
ble degree of latitude in choosing lead 
managers for bond issues. That choice is 
absolutely vital, given that five tasks 
devolve upon the lead manager: 
(1) preparing the prospectus and neces-
sary documentation ; 
(2) choosing the members of the issuing 
syndicate : in the case of the EIB, this is 
deemed to be the entire responsibility 
of the lead banker ; 
(3) agreeing with the issuer the terms 
and conditions of the loan to be flo-
ated ; 
(4) distributing allocations from the pla-
cing among the members of the syndi-
cate ; 
(5) ensuring — and this is critical for a 
permanent borrower like the EIB, need-
ing constantly to return to the markets 
— that the paper commands a good 
quotation in the secondary market. 
From these tasks stem various essential 
criteria for the choice of a lead mana-
ger, who must in particular be able to 
offer : 
(a) adequate, well-established placing 
capacity ; 
(b) the wherewithal and experience to 
get the best possible terms and condi-
tions for the issue ; 
(c) the capacity to guarantee that the 
issue will be taken into the market on 
the best possible conditions, to meet 
one of the permanent objectives of the 
EIB. Such a capacity is certainly a prime 
consideration when it comes to deciding 
which Bank will receive the mandate ; 
(d) the ability, as a market maker, to en-
sure that the issue is properly handled 
after its market launch. 
tion of how we handle competitive bid-
ding as such. 
Liberalisation has advanced to varying 
degrees in the markets which, coupled 
with the constraints and usages peculiar 
to certain of them, means that different 
procedures are still being used in con-
tention against each other for the con-
ferral of mandates on bond issue lead 
managers. 
While it may not be difficult to describe 
the various procedures that are currently 
practised, it is far from easy to predict 
the pace at which they may evolve in 
terms of the market, still less to quantify 
what advantages may accrue from one 
way of appointing a lead manager as 
compared with another. To be able to 
arrive at an objective, reasoned judge-
ment, one has to be able to take stock 
of the market situation at the moment of 
the launch, to compare terms and condi-
tions, in particular coupon and issue 
price and of course the way in which 
investors would have received the issue, 
had it been launched through some al-
ternative procedure. 
The ways and means whereby the pla-
cing of a mandate is decided may be 
numerous and varied, but in principle 
they have their origin in just two diffe-
rent philosophies : either a certain auto-
matic order of designation is estab-
lished, which must be respected by the 
issuer ; or there is freedom of choice, to 
a greater or lesser extent, for the issuer 
but in particular room for recourse to 
competitive bidding. 
As the EIB makes use of these various 
techniques, I should like now to glance 
in turn at their main characteristics befo-
re returning in closer detail to the ques-
Where the choice of lead manager is 
imposed 
There may be various reasons why the 
issuer does not enjoy a completely free 
hand in selecting a lead manager, with 
the choice more or less imposed upon 
him from outside. Where this is the 
case, a number of specific techniques 
may be equally to hand. These relate, 
if not to the composition of the syndica-
te, at least to the designation of the lead 
manager : 
(1) either the banking syndicate res-
ponsible for the placing of the bond 
issue is fixed, with a single lead mana-
ger. This is still the situation for the EIB 
on a number of domestic public mar-
kets, such as Germany, with Deutsche 
Bank, Belgium with Générale de Banque 
or the Netherlands, with AMRO ; 
(2) or the banking syndicate is fixed 
but with rotation of lead manager. 
This happens for the EIB in Switzerland, 
with the "great syndicate" comprising 
the UBS, Crédit Suisse and SBC ; in 
Luxembourg, for public issues, on the 
Japanese markets, until very recently, 
and again in the USA for yankee bond 
operations. 
In such a system one can discern the le-
gacy of the past, at times still potent, 
the static character of which is at odds 
with the new and dynamic trends in va-
rious markets. Moreover the fixity of this 
situation is tending gradually to relax. 
You can see this in Switzerland, for in-
stance, where cracks are beginning to 
appear in the great syndicate, none of 
whose members feel any longer syste-
matically obliged to take part in each 
and every issue given over to this syndi-
cate. The EIB has imparted flexibility to 
the system by making regular calls, after 
complete rotation of the great syndi-
cate, to another syndicate of local banks 
(the "little syndicate" — also with lead 
manager rotation) to handle its public 
issues on the Swiss market. Something 
similar is happening on the yankee mar-
ket. 
One's main quarrel with the fixed-
syndicate format — theoretically at least 
— is that, by definition, it denies the 
issuer the best possible terms for his 
issue. The stimulus of competition does 
not automatically come into play. This 
however is not to deny that there are 
cases where the issuer may still com-
mand the best possible terms a given 
market may be able to offer. 
Because the syndicate is pre-
established, the lead manager will fre-
quently, in the pricing, make sure that 
he has the blessing, if not of all other 
members of the syndicate, then at least 
of the most important of them, before 
putting the terms and conditions of the 
issue to the issuer. This prior search for 
minimal consensus — akin to a common 
denominator — makes for a real risk of 
the coupon and the issue price both 
being set higher than they could have 
been in the event of a single proposal 
coming from just one bank which would 
be likely to take a more aggressive stan-
ce. In other words, the chances are that 
concern for security and a safe placing 
will gain the day over the assumption of 
a risk, stemming from a hint of comba-
tiveness, at least where the market 
would allow. 
In such a situation, the issuer may be 
expected, for each launching, to be in 
possession of such exact information 
from various participants in the market, 
whether or not members of the syndica-
te, as to be able where necessary to ex-
press a firm viewpoint, should it differ 
from that of the syndicate, and to en-
gage in tight negotiations with that syn-
dicate. 
Moreover, the fixed-syndicate formula is 
extremely restricting and immovable 
when it comes to the composition of the 
syndicate, with possible repercussions 
on the way in which the issue is placed. 
Experience shows that this rigidity does 
not in general allow of progressive 
adaptation to the often highly mutable 
state of the market, because the effec-
tive placing capacity of many members 
of the syndicate may itself develop dis-
parately. On the one hand, it is very dif-
ficult for the syndicate members to mo-
dify even by a few points or tenths of a 
point the distribution breakdown of the 
bonds to be placed ; indeed the least 
modification has implications for the 
percentages of all the other participants, 
whose immediate intercession with the 
lead manager will effectively block 
everything. Even more difficult to coun-
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tenance however is the admission of 
new members, whose placing capacity 
has grown so much as to exceed that of 
the old members quite appreciably, and 
which thus cannot be used directly by 
the issuer. 
In other words, and especially when the 
syndicate dates back some years, this 
formula tends to reflect the current state 
of the market less and less, which 
means it precludes using all possible 
placing opportunities at a given mo-
ment, let alone making optimal use of 
them. It can, on the other hand, involve 
making allocations to certain banks 
which, unable to place them effectively, 
will rapidly be constrained to release 
them, either on the market or to other 
syndicate members, with or without re-
turn of commission. Of course the re-
lease of bonds can take place only at 
the expense of the issuer, with conse-
quences that can affect the behaviour of 
its bonds both in the primary market 
and subsequently the secondary market. 
The system does nevertheless have its 
advantages — or at least one essential 
advantage, which resides in the almost 
structured grouping of a number of 
banks, periodically pooling their efforts 
to ensure the placing of bond issues for 
which they share the responsibility. 
Where the market situation is uncertain, 
or actually bad, the presence and the 
permanence of such a syndicate furn-
ishes the issuer with support and solid 
security (not necessarily whole and en-
tire) by dint of its status, placing capac-
ity and market clout. The worse the mar-
ket situation, the more appreciable 
these strengths become. 
In a word, the "imposed" lead manager 
formula, while not generally and syste-
matically enabling the issuer to be sure 
of commanding the best possible mar-
ket terms on all issues, at least allows 
him, when the economic climate fal-
ters, to cut considerably the risk factor 
and provide a hedge against a flop. This 
is quite the opposite from a specific 
operation mandated to a syndicate, put 
together for such a single placing opera-
tion under closely-defined, once-only 
conditions. 
Where there is total freedom in the 
choice of lead manager 
There are in theory three options open 
to any issuer who enjoys a totally free 
hand in choosing his lead manager. The 
choice arising, in each individual case, 
can be shaped simultaneously by the 
market, economic conditions, any pecu-
liar circumstances (for instance, special 
opening for pre-placing) and, of course, 
the capacity and power of the lead 
bank. 
The first of these options is the direct 
designation of a lead banker, a move 
that can be motivated by a number of 
considerations : 
— a pre-eminent position in a given 
market at a given point in time, making 
the bank in question more or less the 
obligatory, most natural channel of ac-
cess to a market in which it would sub-
sequently become one of the main mar-
ket makers ; 
— the existence of special links bet-
ween the issuer and the designated 
bank, such as for instance consideration 
for a valued service rendered previously 
to the issuer ; 
— designation by the issuer in consi-
deration of a specific service rendered 
by the bank. Such a service might have 
benefited the issuer on either: 
— the assets side of the balance sheet ; 
there might, for instance, have been a 
substantial (global) loan from the issuer 
to the bank, the size of which warranted 
special market issue ; or on 
— the liabilities side ; we have, for ex-
ample, the case — happily, somewhat 
rare — where the EIB is looking for a 
particular currency, such as the ecu, for 
which it is always faced with strong de-
mand, at a time when the ecu market is 
not buoyant, where the chance of a cur-
rency (or even interest-rate) swap ope-
ration is offered by a bank that looks 
like a valid counter party, that is, one 
with at least an AA credit rating. 
In such a case, equal consideration has 
to be given to both the final conditions 
attaching to receipt of the currency after 
the swap (ecu in the event) and those 
covering the issue of the currency to be 
swapped (US or Canadian dollar or Yen, 
for example) to take concrete cases. In-
deed, for an issuer like the EIB, ever-
present on a number of markets, the 
problem is to obtain ecus on sufficiently 
keen terms to ensure ease of re-lending, 
without detriment to its issuer's image 
from the secondary market quotation for 
the currency originally issued and swap-
ped. 
In other words — and here we are at 
odds with what frequently happens in 
the swap market — one of the ElB's cri-
teria for designating a bank to handle 
both the issue and the swap is that both 
of these more or less simultaneous ope-
rations should be carried out under pro-
pitious market conditions — where there 
is no scope for playing off one market 
against the other. 
The second solution is to designate a 
lead manager on the basis of a call 
for bids. This is a procedure which the 
EIB has been using for some years in a 
number of markets, both public and pri-
vate. It is now coming into more general 
use, which looks like the logical out-
come of the double process of liberal-
isation and internationalisation, which 
has made great strides in recent years. 
Fortunately, such a trend gives new 
scope to borrowers, national and foreign 
alike, making calls on these markets. 
It was on the German "Schuldschein 
Darlehen" and Swiss private placings 
markets that the EIB pioneered this pro-
cedure. The results were positive in both 
cases, enabling the Bank to reach inves-
tors who would otherwise have re-
mained outside the orbit of its tradition-
al operations. 
The procedure was extended progress-
ively to other private markets like 
Belgium and public operations, for ins-
tance on the international US and Cana-
dian dollar markets. Then came various 
public and private markets within the 
Community, such as the United King-
dom, Italy, Spain and France. 
There are a number of qualifications 
that need to be made about the intro-
duction of such a procedure. As regards 
form, the situation varies fundamentally 
according to whether the mandate is 
conferred on the basis of simple direc-
tions sought by the issuer or after a call 
for bids as such. 
(a) In the first case, which is a procedu-
re used by certain governments and 
from time to time by the EIB, the issuer 
asks a small number of preselected 
banks to provide it with indications as to 
the likely terms and conditions of the 
market issue. This approach makes it 
possible to form a close conception of 
what the primary market is at a given 
moment, provided the range of banks 
consulted is open enough. Where 
necessary, it also offers a way of confer-
ring a mandate very swiftly, but only 
after those simple indications have been 
formally translated into concrete propo-
sals. As a matter of fact, where a num-
ber of potential lead managers sense 
that the borrower is likely to move swift-
ly onto a given market, they will often 
provide him with such indications with-
out even being asked. 
(b) In the second case, we are talking of 
competitive bidding as such. The EIB is 
having more and more recourse to this 
procedure on various markets, both in-
ternational and domestic, wherever it 
feels this can serve its purpose. Such re-
course however presupposes absolute 
respect for the very precise rules of the 
game, while use of the procedure, al-
though ¡deal in theory, may not always 
necessarily be the best possible solu-
tion. It is as well to look at various fac-
tors, both structural and occasionally 
cyclical, that can bear upon the markets 
in question. 
As far as the rules of the game are con-
cerned, and without going too far into 
these, suffice it to recall Rule No 1, 
which is that all banks participating 
must be treated on a basis of precise 
equality, with no room to countenance 
special treatment for any one of them at 
any time. This means in particular that 
the date for submission of tenders must 
be scrupulously adhered to, that all par-
ticipants must be in full possession of all 
the basic data and that these must be 
clear and explicit. Moreover, one of the 
pitfalls to be avoided, after the submis-
sion of tenders, is having one or other 
participant come up with new proposals, 
by definition more attractive, likely to 
take a procedure so far perfectly drawn 
up and followed, and reduce it to a run 
of bilateral bargaining sessions which, if 
the issuer became committed, could 
lead to all sorts of consequences more 
or less impossible to foresee. 
Experience shows it to be ill-advised to 
maintain too heavy a short-list of banks : 
between three and five, depending on 
market and other conditions, would 
seem about right. It is often useful also 
to let each participant know how many 
other banks are involved and which : 
this tends to ease their task in preparing 
the issue and expediting the establish-
ment of the syndicate, once the manda-
te has been conferred. 
Another problem not always easy to re-
solve is to draw up a list of banks con-
sulted for each issue. This is a question 
of the general policy of the institution 
operating on both international and do-
mestic markets. If, like the EIB, the iss-
uer has reached the stage of maintain-
ing relations with a large number of 
banks, the better approach, if it wishes 
to give them all an equal chance (which 
could eventually be modulated), is to 
draw up a long list of all banks, to be 
consulted in turn over a number of ope-
rations in the same market, with the cor-
responding short-lists extracted from 
that long list for each succeeding issue. 
In seeking greater objectivity and more 
efficiency, such a policy may, as in the 
case of the French or Italian markets, 
lead to the establishment of separate 
lists according to the specialisation or 
market-making activities of the banks 
concerned, which will not necessarily 
exclude their appearance on more than 
one list. These may also break down 
between Euro-markets and domestic 
markets. 
Last but not least, bear in mind that a 
call for tenders is not in itself an adjudi-
cation. In other words, the issuer is not 
constrained systematically to confer his 
mandate on the lowest bidder. He re-
tains complete freedom of discretion 
and is able to decide if, in the light of 
the market situation, the lowest tender 
is realistic and such that he can mount 
an operation with a guarantee of suc-
cess. 
Such an assessment obviously oversteps 
the bounds of the formal call for bids 
and touches upon the crux of the pro-
blem. The delicacy of the situation may 
be heightened by the fact that every 
issuer, a fortiori when he is using com-
petitive bidding, is clearly out to secure 
the best possible terms for the issue he 
is planning to float. This means that the 
terms and conditions attaching thereto 
must be the keenest possible, that is to 
say the lowest possible within the mar-
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ket. In other words the main diff iculty is 
to maintain a clear view, at any given 
moment, of the borderline between 
what is inside and what is outside the 
market (because of the increasing fre­
quency and acuteness of f luctuations, 
stemming largely f rom the process of in­
ternationalisation). 
This is of the essence to every issuer, 
stemming from recourse to competit ive 
bidding, which by definit ion is a very ef­
ficient tool for getting the best possible 
market terms at any given t ime. But it is 
a tool to be wielded with caution. If the 
issuer is not on his guard, competi t ion 
between banks to land a mandate, per­
haps at any price, may in fact lead to 
issues of indeterminate success or even 
flops. 
Experience also shows that competit ive 
bidding is not necessarily the answer for 
all prospective issues : to get the most 
out of the benefits it offers, a number of 
conditions need to be ful f i l led. The mar­
ket concerned needs first of all to be 
sufficiently developed and adult and to 
afford minimal l iquidity, without which 
there is no way the call for bids can 
work. Today, for instance, such precon­
ditions seem to obtain on the Japanese 
samurai and Euro­yen markets. There, as 
a first exercise, the EIB, wi th certain ex­
ceptions in the Euro­yen sector, mandat­
ed a syndicate consisting of four major 
security houses wi th lead manager rota­
tion. We have now come to think it both 
preferable and possible — and we have 
let this be known — once the last cycle 
has been completed, to move on to 
competit ive bidding, which could of 
course include, in the Euromarket, the 
London subsidiaries of the major 
Japanese banks, alongside the security 
houses. 
These considerations apart, an objective 
review of the various markets — interna­
tional, domestic or Euro — brings me to 
the personal conclusion that competit ive 
bidding, attractive and effective though 
it may be, is not necessarily a universal 
panacea, nor wil l it systematically in all 
cases enable the best advantage to be 
taken of whatever scope exists in a 
given market at a given t ime. 
Before wielding this tool to launch an 
issue, we would do well objectively to 
analyse the situation, for our f indings 
may well vary wi th economic conditions. 
On some markets, for instance, such as 
domestic markets or recently­opened 
Euromarkets on the threshold of deve­
lopment — witness the Portuguese mar­
ket — the banks are not numerous 
enough nor of sufficient capacity yet to 
justify setting them in competit ion wi th 
each other through formal competit ive 
bidding. In other cases, as with very 
specific markets — some of the Euro­
markets and even the ecu market, de­
pending on cyclical t r e n d s — the l imited 
number of true market makers and their 
high degree of specialisation may also 
argue for excluding the option of com­
petit ive bidding. Then again, there are 
markets where, under normal condi­
tions, competit ive bidding is feasible 
when things are going well and the mar­
ket is holding up, but where temporary 
diff icult ies may put the procedure off 
the agenda in the interests of efficiency 
and good sense. Finally, there are still 
other markets — Germany being a case 
in point — where, for the t ime being at 
least, the procedure to be fol lowed for 
public issues precludes recourse to 
competit ive bidding. 
A third possibility is adjudication 
which, as I have already noted, differs 
f rom competit ive bidding only in the 
automatic choice that results f rom the 
tenders received. Recourse to this pro­
cedure implies that the issuer declines 
any freedom of choice and any altern­
ative evaluation of bids received in the 
light of market conditions. In the case of 
the EIB, this procedure is only used in 
very particular cases where the autom­
atic selection factor seems unlikely to be 
a potential source of problems. We may 
fol low that route for operations under 
our commercial paper programme for 
such amounts as we care to decide. 
Ecu 
These were the thoughts I wanted to ex­
press, in the light of my experience, on 
the main issuing techniques and in parti­
cular competi t ive bidding. On this fasci­
nating but very delicate topic, we need 
to be above all pragmatic and very alert 
in a constantly changing environment ; 
competit ive bidding techniques are no 
exception to the rule and should, at all 
events, be handled wi th caution. 
Below are the ECU's values in national 
currencies, as at 30 June 1989 ; these 
rates are applied to the third quarter in 
preparing financial statements and 
operational statistics of the Bank : 
DEM 
GBP 
FRF 
ITL 
NLG 
ESP 
2.06770 
0.683449 
7.02120 
1 495.95 
2.33055 
131.581 
BEF 
LUF 
DKK 
GRD 
IEP 
PTE 
USD 
43.2974 
43.2974 
8.04631 
178.135 
0.777479 
173.147 
1.05900 
EIB-Information is published periodi­
cally by the European Investment 
Bank in nine different languages 
(Danish, Dutch, English, French, 
German, Greek, I tal ian, Portuguese 
and Spanish). 
Material which appears in EIB-
Information may be freely reproduced ; 
an acknowledgement would be appre­
ciated and also a cl ipping of any article 
published. 
100, bd Konrad Adenauer 
L-2950 Luxembourg 
tel. 4379-1 — telex 3530 bnkeu lu 
telecopier 43 77 04 
Department for Italy: 
Via Sardegna, 38 — 1-00187 Rome 
tei 4719-1 — telex 611130 bankeu I 
telecopier 474 58 77 
Athens Office: 
Ypsilantou 13-15 
GR-10675 Athens 
tei 7249811 
telex 222126 bkeu gr 
telecopier 7249 814 
Lisbon Office : 
Avenida da Liberdade, 144-156, 8? 
P-1200 Lisbon 
tel. 328989 or 328848 
telex 15576 bnkeu ρ 
telecopier 3704 87 
London Office : 
68, Pall Mall 
London SW1Y 5ES 
tel. 839 3351 
telex 919159 bankeu g 
telecopier 930 9929 
Madrid Office : 
Calle José Ortega y Gasset, 29 
E-28006 Madrid 
tel. 431 1340 
telex 44670 bnkeu e 
fax 431 1383 
Representative Office in Brussels: 
Rue de la Loi 227 
Β-1040 Brussels 
tel. 23098 90 — telex 21721 bankeu b 
telecopier 2305827 
Printed in Luxembourg by Imprimerie 
Centrale, 15, rue du Commerce, Luxembourg 
8 
